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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction

I
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Code Annotated §78-2a-3(j).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
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"For an error to require reversal, the likelihood of a
different

outcome

must

be

confidence in the verdict."

sufficiently

high

to

undermine

State v. Hamilton, 827 P. 2d 232,

citing State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913 (Utah 1987).
DETERMINATIVE RULES
Rule 103 of the Utah Rules of Evidence applies to this
matter

and

is

set

Appellant's Brief.

forth

in

full

in the Addendum

of the

In relevant part, Rule 103 of the Utah

Rules of Evidence reads as follows:
Rule 103. Rulings on evidence
(a) Defective erroneous ruling. Error may
not be predicated upon a ruling which admits or
excludes evidence unless a substantial right of
the party is affected and
(1) Objection.
In case the ruling
is one admitting evidence, a timely
objeccion or motion to strike appears of
record, stating the specific ground of
objection, if the specific ground was not
apparent from the context;
* * *

(d) Plain error.
Nothing in this rule
precludes taking notice of plain errors affecting
substantial rights although they were not brought
to the attention of the court.
(Addendum 1)
Rule 401 of the Utah Rules of Evidence applies to this
matter and reads as follows:
Rule 401. Definition of "relevant evidence"
"Relevant evidence" means evidence having
any tendency to make the existence of any fact
that is of consequence to the determination of
the action more probable or less probable than it
would be without the evidence.
-2-

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
NATURE OF THE CASE
This litigation arose out of a May 12, 1993, automobile
accident in which plaintiff Debra Larsen was rear-ended by a
vehicle driven by defendant Melinda Johnson.
that

as a result,

she

injured

Plaintiff alleged

her back.

Prior to this

accident, however, plaintiff was involved in a more serious
rear-end accident in which she suffered the same type of injury
for which

she brought

litigation

and

her

suit against

claim

the defendant

in this

in this litigation was that the

accident with defendant aggravated her pre-existing injury.
COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
This case was tried to a jury beginning April 15, 1996,
and continuing through April 17, 1996, before the Honorable
Timothy R. Hanson of the Third Judicial District Court.
During the trial, evidence was introduced to show the
nature and extent of plaintiff's prior injury following an
automobile accident of November, 1988.

Plaintiff was cross-

examined regarding symptoms experienced after her first rearend accident using a deposition taken in the course of the
lawsuit stemming from the 1988 accident.
cross-examination,

she

was

asked

In the course of that

whether

or

not

previously filed suit and no objection was raised.
-3-

she

had

She was

subsequently

asked

to

confirm

that

her

first

lawsuit

was

settled for $172,000 and her attorney objected to this on the
basis of relevance.
direct

examination,

personally

received

This objection was overruled.
the

plaintiff

after

explained

payment

of

how

medical

On remuch

she

expenses,

attorney's fees and out of pocket expenses.
On

the

afternoon

of

April

17, 1996, the

case

was

submitted to the jury with an instruction regarding aggravation
of a pre-existing injury (See Addendum 4).
DISPOSITION BY THE TRIAL COURT
The

jury

unanimously

found

that

the

defendant

was

negligent but that defendant's negligence was not the proximate
cause of plaintiff's

injuries.

The trial court entered a

judgment for defendant based on the jury's verdict.
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
1.
automobile

This

lawsuit

accident

arises

out

of

a

May

12,

1993,

in which a Subaru driven by defendant

Melinda Johnson struck the rear end of a Suburban driven by
plaintiff, Debra Larsen.
2.

(See R. 1-5, 377, 321).

At the time of the accident, both plaintiff and

defendant got out of their vehicles and looked for damages but
could find none.

(See R. 331, 391, 392).

-4-

3.

When plaintiff returned home, however, her husband

noticed damage to the rear bumper of the plaintiff's Suburban.
(See R. 393).

This damage was subsequently repaired for $45.

(See R. 627)
4.

Plaintiff

was

involved

in

an

earlier

automobile

accident in November of 1988 in which the vehicle in which she
was riding as a passenger was rear-ended as the plaintiff was
twisted in her seat.

Plaintiff believed that the vehicle which

struck

her vehicle

was

pushed

the vehicle

in which

vehicle ahead.
5.
suffered

traveling

at

3 0 mph and

plaintiff

was

riding

the

impact

into

the

(See R. 362, 363 and 610).

Following the accident of November, 1988, plaintiff
from

more

than

four

years

of

low

back

pain

and

underwent a lengthy course of treatment with numerous medical
providers,

multiple

medical

procedures

and

ultimately,

in

December of 1991, she underwent a two-level fusion at L4-5, L5Sl by Reed Fogg.
6.

(See R. 363, 364-368, 470-474, 516-521)

Following

plaintiff's

fusion

surgery

in December,

1991, she had a significant period of recovery with associated
limitation

of

activities,

periodic

set-backs

requiring

injections of pain medication as she increased her activities,
however, on March 30, 1993, a day after receiving $172,000 in
settlement of her lawsuit associated with the 1988 accident,
-5-

Dr. Fogg found the plaintiff to be doing extremely well and
released her from his care.

(R. 442, 481, 482, 487, 488, 489,

490, 522-524)
7.
1991,

Following

plaintiff's

probably

treating

have a permanent

15% to 20%.
8.
he

plaintiff's

fusion

physician

surgery

stated

in December,

that

impairment rating of

she

would

approximately

(Addendum 2 - Trial Exhibit D-16, R. 529-531).

Although plaintiff's treating physician stated that

attributed

her

back

pain

subsequent

to

the

May,

1993,

accident to that accident, he also testified that he did not
know what the pain generator was for the plaintiff and could
find no objective explanation of her pain.
9.

Plaintiff's

treating

(R. 507, 533)

physician

testified

that

plaintiff's pain pattern prior to the May, 1993 accident was
very complex and made diagnosis very difficult.

Following the

May, 1993 accident, plaintiff's symptoms of back pain were not
consistent nor does Dr. Fogg, her treating physician, know what
the cause of the pain is as there is no objective indication of
what

that

is.

She

undetermined etiology.
10.

is diagnosed

as having

chronic pain of

(See R. 520, 532, 533)

Plaintiff's treating physician also testified that

subsequent to a fusion, some people subsequent to the surgery

-6-

do well

for a period

of

time and

really never get well again.
11.

Plaintiff's

reconstruction

expert,

Dr.

then do poorly

and

then

(R. 524, 525)
biomechanical
Paul

France,

and

accident

testified

that

the

force resulting from the May, 1993 rear-end impact alone was
insufficient to cause her injury and that it was strictly the
plaintiff's turning and rotating to try and catch her daughter
who was falling from her standing position on the back seat
which could have caused the plaintiff's injury.

(See R. 568,

569)
12.

Plaintiff

testified at trial that after she felt

the impact from defendant's vehicle striking her vehicle from
behind and causing her to lean back and then forward in her
seat, she turned to try and catch her young daughter who was
falling off the back seat.

She then just sat in her seat.

(See R. 382, 388, 389, 450, 451, 456)
13.

Prior

to

trial,

plaintiff

testified

in

her

deposition that after she felt the jolt from behind, her body
went back and forward and that afterward, she sat there for
what was either seconds or minutes.
defendant's
physician

representative
and

to

Dr.

prior

Nathaniel

Plaintiff's explanation to
to

trial

Nord,

and

the

to

her

own

physician

who

performed an independent medical examination on the plaintiff
-7-

was the same as that given at the time of her deposition, never
mentioning the turning motion to catch her child.

(See R. 447,

448, 449, 453, 533, 534, 697)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Plaintiff was involved in a serious automobile accident
in November of 1988.

Following that accident, she suffered

from more than four years of back pain, was seen by numerous
physicians, underwent multiple medical procedures and after a
difficult period of

time diagnosing the exact source of her

pain, she underwent a two-level fusion performed by Dr. Reed
Fogg

in

December

of

1991.

Following

her

fusion

surgery,

plaintiff was given a 15% to 20% permanent impairment rating.
In the year following that surgery, she had a lengthy period of
recovery

with

associated

limitation

of

activities,

periodic

flare-ups of pain and treatment for pain.
On March 29, 1993, the lawsuit which she

filed as a

result of the November, 1988 accident was settled for $172,000.
The following day, she was seen by her physician who found her
to be doing "extremely well" and released her from his care.
On May 12, 1993, the plaintiff was involved in a minor
rear-end accident.
began

to

Following that, the condition of her back

deteriorate

until

as

-8-

of

the

time

of

trial,

she

complained of constant back pain.

Her physician was unable to

find any objective indicator of the source of her back pain.
The plaintiff's

claim

in

this

lawsuit

is that

the

accident of May, 1993 lit up or aggravated the injuries which
she

sustained

in the November, 1988 accident.

At trial,

evidence of the lawsuit which the plaintiff filed following the
November, 1988 accident was admitted without objection from
plaintiff's counsel.

Plaintiff's counsel did, however, object

to the admission of the amount of the settlement of that
lawsuit.
Objection

to

the

admission

of

evidence

of

the

plaintiff's lawsuit for the permanent injuries she sustained in
November, 1988 was waived and the requirements of "plain error"
necessary to overcome the failure of plaintiff's counsel to
object have not been met.

Evidence of both the prior lawsuit

and the amount of the settlement of that lawsuit is relevant
to the plaintiff's claim that the 1993 accident aggravated or
lit

up

her

consistent

pre-existing

with prior Utah

condition
case

discretion constituting error.

and

its

law and not

admission

is

an abuse of

Even if the trial court erred

in admitting this evidence, that error was harmless in light of
the evidence supporting the jury's verdict.

-9-

ARGUMENT
Introduction
In November of 1988, plaintiff was involved in a serious
automobile accident.

She was struck by a vehicle traveling at

about 30 miles an hour while twisted in her seat.

Following

that accident in 1988, she underwent a course of more than four
years of back pain, was seen by numerous physicians, underwent
multiple medical procedures and after a difficult period of
time diagnosing the exact source of her pain, she underwent a
two-level fusion at L4-5, L5-S1 in December of 1991.
surgery was performed by Dr. Reed Fogg.

This

Following that surgery

in December of 1991, the plaintiff had a significant period of
recovery with associated limitation of activities, periodic set
backs regarding injections of pain medication as she increased
her activities and according to her husband, required a full
year for recovery from the December, 1991 surgery.
She filed a lawsuit for the injuries sustained in the
November, 1988, accident.

Prior to the settlement of that

lawsuit, she was given a 15% to 2 0% permanent impairment rating
by Dr. Fogg, her treating physician.
On March 30, 1993, the day after she received $172,000
in settlement of the lawsuit associated with her 1988 accident,
Dr. Fogg saw the plaintiff for the first time since November of
-10-

1992 when he had injected her with pain medication for a flareup of discomfort.

When Dr. Fogg saw the plaintiff in March, he

found her to be doing extremely well, releasing her from his
care.
On May 12, 1993, the plaintiff was involved in a minor
rear-end collision in which the defendant's Subaru struck her
Suburban at a low speed.

Although no damage to either vehicle

was noted at the scene of the accident, plaintiff's husband
subsequently

discovered

that

the

plaintiff's

Suburban

was

damaged and this was repaired at a cost of $45.
The plaintiff claimed in the lawsuit pending before this
Court

that

following

this

condition began to spiral

accident
downward

in

May

of

1993,

her

causing her to undergo

another surgery for removal of the hardware inserted at the
time of the fusion and ultimately, as of the date of trial, to
be

in a state of

plaintiff's

constant

treating

low back pain.

physician,

Dr.

Fogg,

Although the
stated

that

he

attributed plaintiff's current pain to the May, 1993 accident,
he conceded that he was unable to determine the source of her
current low back pain as there was no objective evidence of any
pain

generator.

He

further conceded

that

there are some

patients who undergo the type of fusion surgery performed on

-11-

the plaintiff and who do well for a period of time and then
start to do poorly and never do well again.
Plaintiff's

accident

reconstruction

and

biomechanical

expert, Dr. Paul France, testified that the forces from the
rear-end

impact alone would not have caused the

plaintiff's

injury.

It was strictly the turning, twisting motion which the

plaintiff described she made in order to attempt to catch her
child

from

falling

plaintiff

turning

off

the

back

and

twisting

seat.
to

This

catch

testimony

her

child

of
was

inconsistent with her deposition testimony, a prior statement
made

to

defendant's

representative,

statements

made

treating physician, and a statement made to the

to

her

independent

medical examiner, Dr. Nathaniel Nord, less than one month prior
to trial.
POINT I.
THE ADMISSION OF EVIDENCE OF THE PLAINTIFF'S
PRIOR LAWSUIT AND SETTLEMENT WERE IN ACCORD
WITH PRIOR UTAH SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
AND DID NOT CONSTITUTE AN ABUSE OF
DISCRETION BY THE TRIAL COURT.
According

to

the provisions

of Rule

103 of the Utah

Rules of Evidence, a party may not base its claim of error on a
ruling

which

substantial
objection
record,

to

either
right
the

stating

of

admits
the

ruling
the

or

excludes

party
admitting

specific

is

affected

evidence

ground

-12-

evidence

of

and

unless
a

is made

objection,

a

timely
on
if

the
that

ground

was

objection

not

apparent

to the

ruling

from

the

admitting

context.

If

a

timely

evidence was not made, a

claim of error may only be based on a ruling admitting the
evidence which constitutes plain error affecting
rights.

State v. Eldredge, 773 P.2d

29

substantial

(Utah 1989),

cert.

denied 493 U.S. 814, 110 S.Ct. 62, 107 L.Ed2d (1989)
A.

Plaintiff failed to object to the introduction of
evidence of her prior lawsuit and the admission of said
evidence does not constitute error, plain or otherwise.
Plaintiff's counsel made no objection

the

introduction

of

evidence

of

plaintiff's November, 1988, accident.

the

to

the evidence of

lawsuit

following

Plaintiff's deposition

given in connection with her prior lawsuit was used to point
out an inconsistency with her testimony given at the time of
trial.

Beginning on page 425 of the Record, the

following

exchange took place:
Q: (by Ms. Alcabes) Isn't it true that you
actually felt pain from that accident within five
minutes?
A:

Which accident is that?

Q:

The first accident we are talking about.

A:

Within five minutes?

I don't recall that.

Q: OK.
Let me show you -- do you recall that
there was a lawsuit that was filed as a result of
that other accident; is that correct?
A:

That's correct.
-13-

Q: Do you recall that as part of that lawsuit
you had your deposition taken, in fact, on two
occasions?
A:

That's correct.

Q: Do you recall when your deposition was taken
you were placed under oath?
A: That's also correct. ...
R. 429
Q: (by Ms. Alcabes)
OK.
Do you see in the
middle of the page where you are asked, did you
have any sensation of discomfort at that point
right after the two impacts?
What was your
answer?
A:

I think it took a moment to register.

Q: How
impact?

about

A: Oh, yes.
(Addendum 3)
No

within

five

minutes

after

Yes.

objection

is

made

by plaintiff's

counsel

introduction of evidence of the prior lawsuit.
of

the

discussion

the

surrounding

to

this

In the middle

use of plaintiff's

deposition

from her prior lawsuit for purposes of showing that her trial
testimony

was

plaintiff's

inconsistent

counsel

objects

with

prior

that

he

deposition

testimony,

has

seen

never

this

deposition before the date of trial, however, the Court states
that

this

is

not

a

legitimate

objection.

(See

R.

428)

Plaintiff is subsequently cross-examined using her deposition
from the first lawsuit regarding a claim which she made in that
-14-

lawsuit concerning new symptoms of left foot and hand numbness.
Sne claimed on direct examination in this trial that left leg
and foot numbness were new symptoms never experienced prior to
the May,

1993

accident.

(R. 404, 443, 444)

Again, no

objection to use of the deposition from the first lawsuit is
made.
Inasmuch

as

an

objection

to evidence

of

the prior

lawsuit was not made at the time of trial, objection to this
evidence has been waived unless the admission of this evidence
constitutes plain error.

As stated by the Supreme Court in

State v. Eldredge, Id. at 35, "the first requirement for a
finding of plain error is that the error be

f

plain, ' i.e.,

from our examination of the record, we must be able to say that
it should have been obvious to a trial court that it was
committing error. . . .

The second and somewhat interrelated

requirement for a finding of plain error is that the error
affects the substantial rights of the accused, i.e. that the
error be harmful."
In

support

of

her

claim

that

the

error

admitting

evidence of the prior lawsuit (and settlement) was plain error,
plaintiff reiterates her claim that "the fact of an amount of a
prior settlement in an unrelated subsequent (sic) litigation is
completely irrelevant to any issue to be tried...
-15-

The error is

therefore, manifest.

It would be plain to any court that the

issue of a prior suit or settlement is not probative of any
issue, nor will it assist the trier of fact to resolve any
dispute before the trial court."

Appellant's Brief at p. 10.

Plaintiff offers no support for her contention that the court's
decision to allow evidence of the prior lawsuit should have
been obvious to the trial court and therefore, she fails to
meet the first prong of the

"plain error" requirement

for

raising objections to the admission of evidence not objected to
trial.

Moreover, she fails to demonstrate that absent the

inclusion
different.

of

this

evidence,

Having

failed

the
to

verdict

satisfy

would

the

have

"plain

been

error"

requirement, plaintiff has waived her right to object to the
admission of evidence of her prior lawsuit.
B.

The admission of evidence of both the plaintiff's prior
lawsuit and the amount of the settlement thereof did not
constitute an abuse of the trial court's discretion.
The trial court has broad discretion in determining the

relevancy of proffered evidence and error will only be found if
the trial court abused its discretion.

State v. Wetzel, supra.

The admission of evidence of both the prior lawsuit and the
amount of the settlement thereof was relevant to whether the
May,

1993

accident

caused

the

injuries

which

plaintiff

complained of in this lawsuit, was in accord with the Utah
-16-

Supreme Court decision in King v. Barron, 770 P. 2d 975 (Utah
1985) and does not constitute an abuse of discretion on the
part of the trial court.
Plaintiff claims in this appeal that the admission of
evidence of her prior lawsuit and the amount for which she
settled that suit is irrelevant and therefore inadmissible and
as such constitutes an abuse of discretion by the trial court.
It was, in fact, however, the plaintiff herself who introduced
evidence of her prior accident and the resulting injuries.

In

fact, it was plaintiff's theory that the accident in this case
aggravated or lit up her pre-existing injury.

Jury instruction

No. 24 submits plaintiff's theory of aggravation of her preexisting injury to the jury.
A person who has a condition or disability
at the time of an injury is not entitled to
recover damages for that condition or disability.
However, when a defendant's negligence aggravates
or lights up a latent, dormant, or asymptomatic
condition, or one to which the injured person is
predisposed, the defendant is liable to the
injured person for the full amount of damages
which ensue, notwithstanding such diseased or
weakened condition.
In other words, when a
latent condition itself does not cause pain, but
that condition plus an injury brings on pain by
aggravation, the preexisting condition, then the
injury, not the dormant condition, is the
proximate cause of the pain and disability. A
plaintiff, therefore, is entitled to recover all
damages which actually and necessarily follow the
injury.

-17-

This is true even if the person's condition
or disability made the injured person more
susceptible to the possibility of ill-effects
than a normally healthy person would have been,
and even if a normally healthy person probably
would not have suffered any substantial injury.
(See Addendum 4)
The plaintiff refers to the case of King v. Barron, 770
P.2d 975 (Utah 1988), in which the court held that in a limited
context, a plaintiff could on redirect examination, introduce
evidence of the settlement amounts received in suits arising
out of prior injuries.
issue

of

whether

it

The court in King did not address the
is permissible

for the

defendant

to

disclose the amount of the settlement either through direct
examination of his own witnesses or through cross-examination
of the plaintiff.

As noted by plaintiff in her brief, the

court in King does note a prior decision from the state of
Washington, Worthington v. Caldwell, 396 P.2d 797 (Wash. 1964)
in which that court found that while the injuries sustained in
a prior accident might be relevant to her present claim, the
reference to the amount of the settlement of a prior lawsuit by
a plaintiff was "not pertinent".

The Utah Supreme Court in

King simply said that they did not disagree with this analysis.
The King court, however, then proceeded to distinguish
the Worthington case from a case in which the prior accident
and injury had already been injected into the trial.
-18-

In a case

virtually identical to the present case and which the Utah
court described as "well reasoned", a jury verdict in favor of
the defendant was appealed by the plaintiff because of the
admission of evidence of a prior settlement for an earlier
injury.

Kelsey v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific R.R., 117

N.W.2d 559 (1962).

In the Kelsey case, the earlier injury was

to the same area of the plaintiff's back as that claimed in the
present injury, but the plaintiff asserted that the present
accident had aggravated the prior injury, precisely the theory
asserted by the plaintiff, Debra Larsen, in this case before
the court.
In King v. Barron, the Utah court cited the ruling of
the Kelsey court that the introduction of the prior settlement
is proper in a case where the trial court's instructions to the
jury clearly submitted a claim by the plaintiff for aggravation
of a pre-existing injury to her back, and quoted at length and
with emphasis the Kelsey court's reasoning:
In view of this, it was perfectly proper for
defendant to bring out before the jury, in
mitigation of that claim, the nature and extent
of plaintiff's previous back injury. This would
include the amount that he was paid in settlement
therefor.
What influence adverse to plaintiff
this evidence may have had is indeed speculative
since the jury need not have reached the question
of damages. If there was any adverse influence,
any such effect could have been diminished or
erased if plaintiff had availed himself of the
opportunity he had to explain the precise nature

of his previous injury as well as the terms of
the settlement.
Kelsey, 117 N.W.2d at 563 (emphasis added by the Utah court in
King at 770 P.2d 980)
The plaintiff maintains that Kelsey does not stand for
the proposition
introduce

that

a defendant may, without restriction,

irrelevant

settlements.

evidence

of

previous

lawsuits

and

As pointed out by the King case, however, Kelsey

does stand for the proposition that when the plaintiff claims
aggravation of a pre-existing back injury, the defendant is
entitled to bring before the jury, evidence of the nature and
extent of the plaintiff's previous back injury, including the
amount that she was paid in settlement.

Any adverse influence

can be erased by an explanation from the plaintiff of the
nature

of

the

injury

and

Plaintiff, in fact, availed

the

terms

herself

of

the

settlement.

of the opportunity

to

explain the amount she personally received after paying all of
her medical expenses, out of pocket expenses and attorney's
fees.

Rather than supporting the idea that the trial court's

decision to allow evidence of a prior settlement would be an
abuse of judicial discretion, the King case points to the idea
that

the

present

absence
such

of

the opportunity

evidence

when
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the

for the defendant

plaintiff

is

to

claiming

aggravation of a pre-existing injury is where the abuse would
lie.

See also Olson v. Hayes, 588 P.2d 68, 72 (Or. App. 1978)
Plaintiff in this case suggests that the cases of Nepell

v. Weifenbach, 274 N.W.2d 728 (Iowa 1979), and Beil v. Mayer,
789 P.2d 1229 (Mont. 1990) are applicable to this case.

It is

unclear in the Nepell case, whether all of the injuries claimed
by the plaintiff in his subsequent injury were identical with
those claimed in his three earlier injuries, however, a divided
court did hold that evidence of the amount of settlements for
the plaintiff's prior injuries was error.

It should be noted,

however, that the three dissenting justices of the Iowa Supreme
Court cited the case of Kelsey v. Chicago, R.I. & P. R.R. case,
supra, with approval asserting that the seriousness of the
plaintiff's

three

prior

injuries

in that

case was

highly

relevant in order to allocate the plaintiff's present problems
between the prior injuries and the injuries claimed in the
current lawsuit.

The dissent pointed out that as the case

before the court involved questions of causation and damages,
the

evidence

of

prior

claims, settlements

and

awards

was

relevant.
In the case of Beil v. Mayer, supra, cited by the
plaintiff, no information is provided concerning whether the
injuries

sustained

by

the

plaintiff
-21-

in

either

his

first

accident or that subsequent to the one which he was suing for
were the same injuries complained of in the lawsuit pending
before the court.

In fact, the basis for the defendant seeking

to admit evidence of the settlement for the subsequent accident
was that the plaintiff in the case pending before the court
sought damages for future medical expenses and future lost
wages and defendant believed that the jury ought to be aware of
the amount awarded for the subsequent accident in order to
calculate

any

damages

expenses resulting
accidents.

for

future

lost

wages

and

medical

from the second in the series of three

The court pointed out that once damages had been

quantified, the trial court could deduct any damages for future
injuries which were

duplicated

distinct injuries, if any.

through separate awards for

The defendant in Beil was concerned

strictly with damages and the plaintiff recovering twice for
future lost wages and future medical expenses and the court
proposed a method for resolving this problem.
did

The Beil case

not entail a situation in which a specific claim for

aggravation
submitted

of

pre-existing

to the jury

injury

was made.

That

claim

in the case before the Court poses

questions of both damages and causation for the jury.
Plaintiff is concerned that the introduction of evidence
of the prior lawsuit and settlement is prejudicial to her since
-22-

it causes the jury to view the plaintiff in a negative light as
someone who is litigious because she has sought the assistance
of the court in the past.

As indicated earlier, evidence of

the prior lawsuit was not objected to by the plaintiff and the
fact

that

she

had,

in

fact,

sought

court

assistance

for

resolution of her prior claims is not one which she may now
complain of.
The testimony in this trial and the plaintiff's medical
records

establish

suffered
worse.

that

since

November,

1988, plaintiff

had

from chronic back pain, sometimes better, sometimes
Although she had been released from Dr. Fogg's care on

March 30, 1993, with a notation in his records that she was
doing extremely well, she had prior to this been given a 15% to
20% permanent impairment rating.
impairment
accident

would

not

and may,

in

have

According to Dr. Fogg, this

increased

after

the

May,

1993

fact, have decreased due to different

factors now used in the evaluation of permanent impairments.
In

the

years

after

her

first

accident,

plaintiff

underwent numerous procedures, some helped for a short time,
some did not.
difficult

with

Diagnosis of the cause of her problem had been
Dr.

Fogg

sending

her

to

a

physiatrist

in

California before performing the fusion surgery in December of
1991.

The plaintiff had an extended period of recovery from
-23-

that

surgery,

marked

by

extreme

limitation

of

activity,

periodic flare-ups of pain as she increased her activities and
periodic injections of Toradol to treat those flare-ups.

Dr.

Fogg conceded at trial that there were patients who underwent
the surgery which plaintiff did in December of 1991 who did
well for a period of time and then who started to do poorly and
just didn't get well again.
After plaintiff's back pain returned following the minor
accident

of May,

referring
helped,

her

only

1993, Dr. Fogg treated her

for

physical

to be

therapy.

followed

At

conservatively,

some

by a return of

points,

this

her pain.

He

removed the hardware which had been placed in her back during
the 1991 fusion surgery, admitting that some patients have a
tissue reaction to the hardware as much as 2% years after the
initial surgery

(see R. 523) .

Finally, he had no explanation

for the source of her chronic back pain.

He could identify no

objective indication of the source of her pain (see R. 533).
On
settlement
November,

March
for

29,
the

1993, the plaintiff
serious

1988, accident.

injuries
Evidence

received

she
of

a

sustained

the

amount

serious
in
of

the
this

settlement, received the day before she was released from her
doctor's

care,

consideration

of

would

clearly

whether

or

be
not
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relevant
the

back

to

the

jury's

complaints

the

plaintiff had at the time of trial were caused by the minor
rear-end accident which occurred on May 12, 1993, or were
merely a continuation of the permanent injuries she sustained
in the more severe 1988 accident and the fusion surgery she
underwent as a result of that accident and for which she had
been compensated.
Evidence of the amount of plaintiff's earlier settlement
of

claims

for

injuries

to the

same part

of

her body as

complained of in this lawsuit following the second accident is
relevant in that it has a tendency to make the existence of a
fact that is of consequence to the determination of this action
more

probable

evidence.

or

less probable

than it would without

(Rule 401, Utah Rules of Evidence)

the

In this case in

which the plaintiff's claim was that of an aggravation of a
pre-existing injury, the court was well within its discretion
by admitting the amount of the settlement of plaintiff's prior
lawsuit in which she claimed that as a result of the 1988
accident, she suffered more than four years of back pain,
underwent numerous procedures, major surgery and for which she
was

given

a

permanent

impairment.

The

compensation

she

received for that permanent injury was entirely relevant to
whether or not the May, 1993 accident aggravated or lit up
plaintiff's

prior

injury

or

whether

-25-

the

pain

which

she

experienced after the May, 1993 accident was a result of the
permanent injuries she sustained in November, 1988.
POINT II.
INTRODUCTION OF EVIDENCE OF PLAINTIFF'S
PRIOR LAWSUIT AND THE SETTLEMENT
THEREOF WAS HARMLESS.
The

admission

of

the

evidence

of

plaintiff's

prior

settlement, the introduction of which plaintiff did object to,
and of her prior lawsuit, which plaintiff did not object to,
was not an abuse of the trial court's discretion.

However,

even if the court finds that the introduction of the amount of
the settlement was an abuse of discretion, in order for this
error

to

require

reversal,

"the

likelihood

of

a

different

outcome must be sufficiently high to undermine confidence in
the verdict".
"The

more

State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232, 240 (Utah 1992)

evidence

supporting

there was harmful error."

the verdict,

the

less

likely

Id. at 24 0.

Although the jury in this case found that the defendant
was negligent, they unanimously found that any negligemce on
the

part

of

the

defendant

plaintiff's injuries.
fact

that

the

did

not

proximately

cause

the

Of significance to this verdict is the

plaintiff's

own

biomechanical

and

accident

reconstruction expert, Dr. Paul France, testified that the rear
end impact in this case in which the defendant's Subaru struck
the plaintiff's

Suburban causing $45 worth of damage to the
-26-

Suburban would not have caused injury to the plaintiff.
568,

569)

(R.

Dr. France testified that it was strictly the

plaintiff's twisting rotational movement at the time of the
impact which could have caused the injury of which she now
complained

(this,

although

even

the

plaintiff's

treating

physician was unable to identify the cause of the plaintiff's
current discomfort.)

(R. 569)

Although plaintiff testified at trial that subsequent to
the impact, after going back against her seat and then forward,
she instinctively turned to try and catch her young child who
had been standing on the back seat, four earlier versions of
the accident related by the plaintiff did not include this
information.

On cross-examination, it was pointed out that

plaintiff did not indicate this in her deposition nor did she
indicate

this

in a

statement

she gave, and at which her

attorney was present, to a representative of defendant.
in

her

deposition

and

in

her

statement

to

Both

defendant's

representative, she indicated that after she was struck, she
just sat in her seat, making no mention of having turned to
catch her child.
Plaintiff also made no such indication of a rotational
movement to her own physician, Dr. Reed Fogg, and Dr. Fogg
himself testified that he just learned of that motion on the
-27-

part of the plaintiff following impact on the Friday before
trial when talking with the plaintiff's counsel.
Dr.

Nathaniel

Nord,

who

conducted

an

(R. 533, 534)

independent

medical

examination on the plaintiff on March 26, 1996, less than one
month before trial, also indicated that he had not been told by
the plaintiff that she instinctively rotated to her right in an
effort to catch her child following impact.

(R. 694, 697)

There was also evidence at trial from defendant's expert
Dr. Tom Blotter, that the force of the impact from defendant's
Subaru

striking

plaintiff's

Suburban

would

have

been

insufficient to have "thrown" plaintiff's four year old child
off the back seat on which she was standing.

Dr. Blotter

testified that the nature of the force would have caused the
plaintiff's child to go back against the back seat cind not
forward.

(R. 668, 669)

Dr. Paul France indicated that he had not, in fact, even
spoken with the plaintiff until the week prior to trial.
566)

Dr. France

further

testified

that his

(R.

investigation

indicated that at the time of the collision, the defendant's
vehicle was not pitching forward as it might if she had been
involved in rapid deceleration.

(R. 571 and 572)

In any event, the uncontroverted evidence in this case
was that the rear-end collision alone would not have injured
-28-

the plaintiff.

Although the plaintiff did testify at trial

that following impact, she attempted to reach for her child,
this testimony differed from that which she had given on four
other occasions, including
physician.

that given to her own treating

The version of what she did following impact, that

is, after going back and forth in her seat, instinctively
turning to try and catch her child and then sitting for seconds
or minutes, denying
defies logic.

that

the accident

actually took place

One second she is instinctively coming to her

child's assistance and the next, she is sitting in her seat in
a state of denial and shock rather than assisting her child off
the floor.
Also of significance is the fact that from the date of
the

plaintiff's

first

accident

in

November

of

1988,

she

underwent a tortured course of back pain, the cause of which
was difficult to diagnose and ultimately, a two level fusion in
December of 1991.

(R. 516-521)

Her husband testified that it

was a year after that December, 1991 fusion surgery before his
wife

recovered

activities.

from

(R. 620)

the

surgery

and

could

resume

her

Dr. Fogg admitted that the plaintiff's

recovery was somewhat longer than other patients, however, her
pain syndrome had always been complex.
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While

his

notes

plaintiff

was

doing

assigned

the

plaintiff

of

March

extremely

30,

well,

between

a

1993,

indicate

Dr. Fog^
15%

to

had

20%

that

already

permanent

impairment rating as a result of her injuries sustained in the
first accident.
underwent

the

He fully conceded that some individuals who
type

of

surgery which the plaintiff

did

in

December of 1991, would do well for a period of time and then
suddenly not do well and never do well again.

Plaintiff's

symptomatology, the fact that as of the date of trial, Dr. Fogg
had no explanation for her pain and could find no objective
source of her discomfort and the fact that she had prior to
being involved in the second accident been given a 15% to 20%
permanent impairment rating indicates that her course following
the second accident was consistent with her course of back pain
ebbing

and

accident.

flowing

from

the

date

of

the

November,

1988

If the court does find that the admission of the

amount of the plaintiff's first settlement was an abuse of
discretion, the likelihood of a different outcome because of
this error is minimal.
In this case, given the uncontroverted testimony that
the rear-end impact alone could not have caused injury to the
plaintiff, and the fact that the plaintiff never mentioned a
twisting movement following impact in the two statements which
-30-

she made under oath and the statements which she made to Dr.
Fogg, her treating physician, and Dr. Nord, less than one month
before trial all support the jury's verdict that defendant's
negligence was not the proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries.
Although

the plaintiff

claims she was never asked

if she

turned to catch her child, she was asked what she did after
impact and responded "I just sat there".
Moreover, her

consistent

course

of

some

improvement

followed by set backs throughout the period of time from the
November, 1988 accident, the fact that she was assigned a
permanent impairment rating following that accident, the fact
that her treating physician could find no basis for her low
back pain subsequent to the second accident, and finally, the
fact that her physician admitted that some individuals who
underwent back fusions did well for a period of time and then
stopped doing well supports the jury's verdict in this case
that

the negligence

plaintiff's

Suburban

of the defendant
was

plaintiff's back injuries.

not

the

in bumping

proximate

cause

into the
of

the

If the admission of the amount of

the plaintiff's settlement of her prior lawsuit were erroneous
and not admitted, the likelihood of a different outcome in this
case,

considering

the other evidence on causation and the

-31-

course of the plaintiff's back pain since November of 1988,
would not have resulted in a different outcome.
CONCLUSION
The trial court's decision to admit evidence of the
amount of the settlement of the plaintiff's prior lawsuit is
consistent with prior Utah case law and was not an abuse of
discretion.

The admission of the fact that plaintiff had filed

a prior lawsuit was not objected to by plaintiff at trial and
the admission thereof was not plainly erroneous.

Given the

evidence that the rear-end impact in this case could not have
injured the plaintiff and the fact that plaintiff's testimony
at trial that she turned to try and catch her child following
impact was inconsistent with the version of the accident which
she provided on

four other occasions and the up and down

history and difficulty in diagnosing the source of plaintiff's
back pain since November of 1988 render the admission of the
amount

of

the

settlement

harmless.
DATED this y

and

the

lawsuit,

if

erroneous,

,
r7

day of September, 1997.
HANSON, NELSON ,>CHIPMAN & QUIGLEY

C2

Attorneys for Defende(nt/Appellee
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seven

(7) copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLEE to the

Clerk of the Utah Court of Appeals, 230 South 500 East #400,
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102, and I further certify that two (2)
copies were mailed
this matter:

to

the

Plaintiff/Appellant's

attorney

in

Terry M. Plant, HANSON, EPPERSON & WALLACE, P.C.,

4 Triad Center #500, Salt Lake City, Utah 84180.

-33-

ADDENDUM

Exhibit 1

-

Rule 103, Utah Rules of Evidence

Exhibit 2

-
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UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE

Rule 103

ARTICLE L
GENERAL PROVISIONS.
gule 101. Scope.
These rules govern proceedings in the courts of this State, to the extent and
^ith the exceptions stated in Rule 1101.
advisory Committee Note. — Adapted
&0Q Rule 101, Uniform Rules of Evidence
0*74). Rule 1101 contains exceptions dealing
jKb preliminary questions of fact, grand jury
proceedings, miscellaneous judicial or quasi-jujjcUl proceedings and summary contempt proendings. Rule 101 and HOI are comparable to
Bale 2 of the Utah Rulea erf Evidence (1971),
n q * that Rule 2 made applicable other pro-

Rules of Evidence applicable in all instances in
courts of the state including situations previously governed by statute, except to the extent
that specific statutory provisions are expressly
retained. Rule 101 also rejects Lopes v. Lopes,
30 Utah 2d 393, 518 P.2d 687 (1974) to the
e x t e n t ^^ i t permits ad hoc development of
^ ^
^ih these
of ^
inconsiBtent
R u l e g rf E v i d e n c e .

^Evidence. In addition, Rule 2 of the Utah ***P** 164 (Utah 1978) that statutoryj>r<m.
Roles of Evidence (1971) expressly made the *°™ of evidence law inconsistent with the
roles applicable to both civil and criminal pre- rules will take precedence is rejected.
Cross-References. — Evidence generally,
cee< ii n g 8 .
Rule 101 adopts a general policy making the 5 78-25-2 et seq.; Rule 43, U.R.C.P.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
Bail hearings.
Chynoweth v. Larson, 572 P.2d 1081 (Utah
The former Utah Rules of Evidence were ap- 1977).
plicable to and controlling at bail hearings.
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. — Utah Rules of EviBiased Evidence Rules: A Framework for Judence 1983, 1985 Utah L. Rev. 63, 68.
dicial Analysis and Reform, 1992 Utah L. Rev.
Utah Rules of Evidence 1983 — Part II, 1987 67.
Utah L. Rev. 467.

Rule 102, Purpose and construction.
These rules shall be construed to secure fairness in administration, elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay, and promotion of growth and development of the law of evidence to the end that the truth may be ascertained and
proceedings justly determined.
Advisory Committee Note. — Rule 102 is
the federal rule, verbatim, and is an adjuration
as to the purpose of the Rules of Evidence.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
Cited in State v. Gray, 717 P.2d 1313 (Utah
1986); State v. Banner, 717 P.2d 1325 (Utah
1986).
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. — Recent Developments
Utah Rules of Evidence 1983 — Part EI,
in Utah Law, 1986 Utah L. Rev. 95, 130.
1995 Utah L. Rev. 683.

Rule 103. Rulings on evidence.
(a) Effect of erroneous ruling. Error may not be predicated upon a ruling
which admits or excludes evidence unless a substantial right of the party is
affected, and
(1) Objection* In case the ruling is one admitting evidence, a timely
objection or motion to strike appears of record, stating the specific ground
of ohrjection, if the specific ground was not apparent from the context; or
(2) Offer of proof. In case the ruling is one excluding evidence, the
substance of the evidence was made known to the court by offer or was
apparent from the context within which questions were asked.

Rule 103

UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE

55*

(b) Record of offer and ruling. The court may add any other or farther
statement which shows the character of the evidence, the form in which it was
offered, the objection made, and the ruling thereon. It may direct the making
of an offer in question and answer form.
(c) Hearing of jury. In jury cases, proceedings shall be conducted, to the
extent practicable, so as to prevent inadmissible evidence from being suggested to the jury by any means, such as making statements or oflers of proof
or asking questions in the hearing of the jury.
(d) Plain error. Nothing in this rule precludes taking notice of plain errors
affecting substantial rights although they were not brought to the attention of
the court.
Advisory Committee Note. — Rule 103 is
the federal rule, verbatim, and is in conformity
with Rules 4 and 5, Utah Rules of Evidence
(1971), Rule 61, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
and Utah case law not involving constitutional
considerations. Subsection (a)(1) is in accord
with Rule 4, Utah Rules of Evidence (1971)
and Stagmeyer v. Leatham Bros., 20 Utah 2d
421, 439 P.2d 279 (1968). See also Bradford v.
Alvey & Sons, 621 P.2d 1240 (Utah 1980);

Szarak v. Sandoval, 636 P.2d 1082 (Utah
1981). Rule 103(d) is a restatement of the plain
error rule. See Rule 4, Utah Rules of Evidence
(1971) and State v. Poe, 21 Utah 2d 113, 441
P.2d 512 (1968).
Croaa-References. — Harmless error in admission or exclusion of evidence, Rule 61,
U.R.C.P.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALY8I8

Applicability.
Bench trial.
Erroneous rulings.
—Cumulative evidence.
—Exclusion.
—Harmless error.
—Objection.
—Offer of proof.
—Substantial right or prejudice.
—Waiver.
Plain error.
Purpose.
Cited.
Applicability.
Adequacy under Subdivision (a)(2) of plaintiffs proffer of expert testimony was irrelevant
where the trial court's exclusion of the testimony was a case management decision and the
substance of the testimony had no bearing on
the court's decision, because the exclusion of
testimony was not an evidentiary ruling to
which Subdivision (a)(2) would apply. Berrett
v. Denver & R.G.W.R.R., 830 P.2d 291 (Utah
Ct. App.), cert, denied, 836 P.2d 1383 (Utah
1992).
Bench trial
When a trial is to a court, the rulings on
evidence are not of such critical moment as
when a trial is to a jury, because it is to be
assumed that the court has, and will use, its
superior knowledge as to competency and the
effect which should be given evidence. Super
Tire Mkt., Inc. v. Rollins, 18 Utah 2d 122, 417
P.2d 132 (1966).
Erroneous rulings.
—Cumulative evidence.
Even if refusal to admit photographs was
error, no prejudice resulted to defendant where
the evidence was cumulative and could have
added nothing to defendant's case. Godeaky v.
Provo City Corp., 690 P.2d 541 (Utah 1984).

—Exclusion.
When evidence is excluded by trie trial court,
any error which may have resulted from such
exclusion is cured when the substance of the
evidence is later admitted through some other
means. State v. Stephens, 667 P.2d 586 (Utah
1983).
—Harmless error.
Where there was no likelihood that the testimony in question had any substantial bearing
on the outcome of the trial, it was not a cause
for reversal. Stagmeyer v. Leatham Bros., 20
Utah 2d 421, 439 P.2d 279 (1968).
Admission of hearsay testimony connecting
defendant with the crime was not prejudicial
where there was other testimony connecting
the defendant to the crime adduced before the
hearsay testimony. State v. Gardunio, 652 P.2d
1342 (Utah 1982).
The improper admission of hearsay evidence
w&s harmless error where the exclusion of such
evidence was not likely to produce a different
result. In re Estate of Hock, 655 P.2d 1111
(Utah 1982).
Denial of a defendant's motion to suppress
certain identification evidence was not a ruling
upon which error can be predicated where
there was other ample evidence of the defendant's culpability. State v. Bullock, 699 P.2d
753 (Utah 1985).
Trial court's error in restricting defense
counsel's cross-examination of the prosecution's key witness concerning bias was harmleas, where the jury had sufficient information
to fully appraise the witness's biases and motivations. State v. Hackford, 737 P.2d 200 (Utah
1987).
Admission of improper impeachment evidence was not prejudicial error, where the testimony did not bear directly on whether defendant did or did not do any of the acts witl
which he was charged, and there was no indi
cation that the testimony improperly influ
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April 21, 1992

Parsons, Behle & Latimer
One Utah Centre
201 South Main Street, Suite 1800
P.O. Box 11898
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0898
Attn:
RE:

Derrick Langton

Debra C. Larsen

Dear Mr. Langton:
It is my medical opinion that most likely Ms. Debra Larsenfs
present complaints and surgery were related to an internal disc
disruption occurring in the 11/05/88 automobile accident. At the
present time Debra is doing well postoperatively. I believe at
this point that her prognosis is good. She probably will have a
partial permanent impairment rating of approximately 15 to 20%.
If you have any further questions regarding this patient, please
feel free to contact my office.

Sincerely,

^ArwflAiiD.
Reed Fogg, M.D.
KD/bg
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Tab 3

1 ACTUALLY FELT PAIN FROM THAT ACCIDENT WITHIN FIVE MINUTES?
2

A

WHICH ACCIDENT IS THAT?

3

Q

THE FIRST ACCIDENT WE ARE TALKING ABOUT.

4

A

WITHIN FIVE MINUTES?

5

Q

O^AY.

I DON'T RECALL THAT.

LET ME SHOW YOU —

DO YOU RECALL

6 THAT THERE WAS A LAWSUIT THAT WAS FILED AS A RESULT OF THAT
7 OTHER ACCIDENT; IS THAT CORRECT?
8

A

THAT'S CORRECT.

9

Q

AND DO YOU RECALL THAT AS PART OF THAT

10 LAWSUIT YOU HAD YOUR DEPOSITION TAKEN, IN FACT, ON TWO
11 OCCASIONS?
12

A

THAT'S CORRECT.

13

Q

DO YOU RECALL THAT WHEN YOUR DEPOSITION WAS

14 TAKEN YOU WERE PLACED UNDER OATH?
15

A

16

MS. ALCABES:

THAT'S ALSO CORRECT.
YOUR HONOR, MAY I PUBLISH A DEPOSI-

17 TION OF MAY 30TH, 1991?
18

MR. PLANT:

YOUR HONOR, I HAVE A DIFFICULTY IN

19 THAT IT'S NOT TAKEN IN THIS CASE.

I DON'T THINK THAT'S

20 APPROPRIATE TO PUBLISH IT. IF IT IS AN INCONSISTENT STATE21 MENT, SO BE IT, BUT IT IS NOT A DEPOSITION
22

THE COURT;

—

WHAT DO YOU INTEND TO VSE IT FOR, MS.

23 I ALCABES?
24

MS. ALCABES:

25

THE COURT:

FOR IMPEACHMENT.

ON SOMETHING SHE'S ALREADY TESTIFIED
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1

TO?

2

MS. ALCABES:

3

THE COURT:

RIGHT.

WELL, I DON'T KNOW THAT I CAN PUBLISH

4 THAT IF IT WASN'T TAKEN IN THIS CASE.
5

SWORN STATEMENT THEN

6

IF YOU HAVE A PRIOR

—

MS. ALCABES:

I REALLY WANT TO JUST GET HER TO

7 TAKE A LOOK AT IT AND READ THE RESPONSE.
8

THE COURT:

I THINK YOU CAN USE IT FOR THAT

9 PURPOSE, BUT IF YOU HAVE A PRIOR DEPOSITION, LAY THE FOUN10 DATION FOR IT.

YOU CAN CERTAINLY ASK HER TO READ PART OF

11 IT.
12

Q

(BY MS. ALCABES)

WOULD YOU MIND TURNING TO

13 PAGE 15 OF THAT DEPOSITION?
14

MR. PLANT:

YOUR HONOR, I AM GOING TO OBJECT.

15 I'VE NEVER SEEN THIS DEPOSITION BEFORE.
16 IT'S NOT TAKEN IN THIS CASE.

I WAS NOT THERE.

I DON'T KNOW WHAT'S GOING ON.

17 I JUST THINK IT IS INAPPROPRIATE UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES.
18

THE COURT:

MS. ALCABES, YOU CAN USE THE DEPOSI-

19 TION IF THERE IS AN INCONSISTENT STATEMENT, BUT I HAVEN'T
20 HEARD AN INCONSISTENT STATEMENT.

YOU NEED TO ASK THE

21 WITNESS THE QUESTION AND IF SHE ANSWERS IN A FASHION THAT
22 YOU THINK IS CONTRARY TO WHAT SHE'S TESTIFIED TO BEFORE,
23 YOU MAY USE IT, BUT YOU CAN'T USE IT THE SAME WAY THAT YOU
24 COULD FOR TAKING A DEPOSITION IN THIS CASE FOR ANY PURPOSE.
25

SO I GUESS YOU GOT TO ASK THE QUESTION AND IF YOU

0 0 0 4 ?• 7
EILEEN M. AMBROSE, C.S.R.

1 THINK THERE IS A DIFFERENT ANSWER HAVE HER READ THE ANSWER
2 IN HER PRIOR SWORN STATEMENT.
3

HAVE WE REACHED THAT POINT?

4

MS. ALCABES:

5

THE COURT:

I THINK WE HAVE.

HAS SHE GIVEN YOU AN ANSWER THAT YOU

6 THINK IS INCONSISTENT WITH PRIOR DEPOSITION TESTIMONY?
7

MS. ALCABES:

8

Q

9 15.

I'M SORRY, YES.

(BY MS. ALCABES)

I'M LOOKING NOW ON PAGE

I'M AT ABOUT LINE FOUR AND YOU WERE ASKED AT THAT

10 TIME, DID YOU HAVE A SENSATION OF DISCOMFORT AT THAT MOMENT
11 RIGHT AFTER THE TWO IMPACTS.
12

MR. PLANT:

AGAIN, YOUR HONOR, I DON'T MEAN TO

13 GET IN THE WAY, BUT THIS IS UNUSUAL, IN THAT I'VE NEVER
14 EVEN SEEN THIS, I DON'T KNOW THE CONTEXT, I AM NOT ABLE TO
15 REHABILITATE BECAUSE I'VE NEVER SEEN THIS DEPOSITION BEFORE
16 TODAY.
17

THE COURT:

I DON'T THINK THAT IS A LEGITIMATE

18 OBJECTION.
19

MR. PLANT:

WELL, THE PROBLEM IS —

20

THE COURT:

IT IS A LEGITIMATE CONCERN.

21

MR. PLANT:

IF IT WERE IN THIS CASE I, AT LEAST,

22 WOULD HAVE BEEN HERE.

I DON'T KNOW WHAT SHE IS TALKING

23 ABOUT.
24

THE COURT:

25 STATEMENT UNDER OATH.

APPARENTLY, YOUR CLIENT MADE A PRIOR
IF THAT'S AN OBJECTION IT'S OVER-
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1

RULED.

2

YOU MAY PROCEED.

3

Q

(BY MS. ALCABES)

OKAY.

DO YOU SEE IN THE

4

MIDDLE OF THE PAGE WHERE YOU WERE ASKED, DID YOU HAVE ANY

5

SENSATION OF DISCOMFORT AT THAT POINT RIGHT AFTER THE TWO

6

IMPACTS?

WHAT WAS YOUR ANSWER?

7

A

I THINK IT TOOK A MOMENT TO REGISTER.

8

Q

HOW ABOUT WITHIN FIVE MINUTES AFTER THE

10

A

OH, YES. YES.

11

Q

OKAY.

12

A

BUT THAT'S REGARDING THE SENSATION, NOT

9

I IMPACT?

CAN WE HAVE

—

13 PAIN.
14

THE COURT:

JUST A MOMENT, MS. LARSEN.

JUST

15 ANSWER THE QUESTION.
16

ASK YOUR NEXT QUESTION.

17

Q

(BY MS. ALCABES)

18 BACK TO LINE 14.

WAS THE QUESTION —

GO

DID YOU HAVE ANY SENSATION OF DISCOMFORT

19 THAT MOMENT RIGHT AFTER THE TWO IMPACTS?

IS THAT WHAT THE

20 QUESTION SAYS?
21

A

THAT'S CORRECT.

22

Q

OKAY.

DID THE POLICE INVESTIGATE THAT

23 OTHER ACCIDENT?
24

25

I

A

YES, THEY DID.

Q

OKAY.

IS IT TRUE THAT AFTER THAT OTHER
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Tab 4

INSTRUCTION NO.

<3*{

A person who has a condition or disability at the time of an
injury is not entitled to recover damages for that condition or
disability.

However, when a defendant's negligence aggravates or

lights up a latent, dormant, or asymptomatic condition, or one to
which the injured person is predisposed, the defendant is liable to
the injured person for the full amount of damages which ensue,
notwithstanding such diseased or weakened condition.

In other

words, when a latent condition itself does not cause pain, but that
condition plus an injury brings on pain by aggravation, the
preexisting conditipn, then the injury, not the dormant condition,
is the proximate cause of the pain and disability.

A plaintiff,

therefore, is entitled to recover all damages which actually and
necessarily follow the injury.
This is true even if the person's condition or disability made
the injured person more susceptible to the possibility of illeffects than a normally healthy person would have been, and even if
a normally healthy person probably would not have suffered any
substantial injury.
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